Why are you not a solipsist

Do I think the world, and is solipsism correct accordingly?

  • hinkelstein wrote:

    Leon wrote:

    And Decartes came to the conclusion that you can question everything except the fact that you exist yourself, because that would be a logical contradiction (I cannot think that I am and at the same time not be. That would be illogical.)
    Hence his cogito ergo sum (I think therefore I am) results from this.

    In solipsism one assumes that there is no other thinking person apart from oneself.

    Yes, so far right. The solipsist has no proof for the existence of other people (their existence can be doubted), consequently for him they are part of the imagined world.

    But if you ask other people if they are thinking, they'll answer: "Of course I think".

    "I think therefore I am" applies just for the one who pronounces the sentence (referring only to himself).
    With that you can Yourself prove that you exist.
    The sentence is not useful if you want to prove the existence of other people with it.
    Other people are part of the external world, i.e. we learn something about them through perception.
    Consequently, the solipsist cannot know whether they exist either.
    You could be a delusion.

    Her thinking is only thought by me. So how can a proponent of solipsism know whether his thinking is not just thought by someone else?

    He doesn't need to know that. He doesn't care at all because it's unimportant.
    The fact that he at all thinks (it's about thinking in itself, not about the content), proves that he exists (because he cannot not exist and think at the same time!)

    Because if the others can succumb to the illusion that they are thinking, there is a possibility that I will also succumb to the illusion that I am thinking.

    No. The moment you think, you have the certainty that you exist.
    You just have no certainty that the others exist.
    And the others have no certainty that you exist.

    So you can doubt that you exist yourself.

    No. You have decartes' Cogito ergo sum not understood.
    With regard to Decartes, consider where the difference lies between:

    So I think I am,

    and

    You think therefore you are.

    (And it is not necessary that the others have to admit the solipsist his existence. The fact that he thinks himself is enough in order to exist)
  • hinkelstein wrote:

    Leon wrote:

    But that does not prove in the slightest, and absolutely not at all, that the other (your waking world) is real.
    But that proves that I don't think the waking world

    No, that doesn't prove anything at all.
    You could only imagine the waking world.
    You have no way to rule out a deception, consequently you cannot prove the existence of a waking world (or any other world independent of you).

    Leon wrote:

    Once for a world that you can shape as you wish, and once for one that defies your attempts.
    How could the world resist my attempts to change it?

    Very simple: Since the solipsistic world is only thought, the parts of the world that you cannot change are thoughts that cannot be influenced by your will.
    What is supposed to be so difficult to understand about it?
    You don't have all your thoughts under control now either.
    Or do you think that when you have to pee and then think "I have to pee" that is what you wanted to think?
    Of course not. You just think it Or when you see an attractive person, you then deliberately and willingly thought: "Oh, this person is attractive".
    Think about it.
    So why should every thought (on which the solipsistic world is based) be controllable by you in solipsimus?

    Am I lord and master of my thoughts, or is the world I have thought lord and master of my thoughts? Does it have a will of its own? The nature of my thoughts doesn't change. So once I get it done, I always get it done. Because I don't feel like remote-controlled underpants. In solipsism the world is what I think, And it is not difficult for me to think the world differently. Still, it doesn't change. How so?

    You don't want to tell me that you can always decide what to think or that you can always decide what to dream?

    Let's say the solipsimus is wrong and you are right.
    Even then there would be thoughts that you willingly influence and others not.
    Why should it be any different in solipsism?
    There are thoughts that you are aware of and that you can control, and others not.
    If the world in solipsism consists only of thoughts, then it consists not only of willful thoughts, but also of involuntary thoughts (from fears, for example) and unconscious thoughts (unconscious longings, etc.).

    So we see that even the reference to immutability through the will is no proof against solipsism.
  • Leon wrote:

    You don't want to tell me that you can always decide what to think or that you can always decide what to dream?
    No I do not want this. But on the other hand you don't want to tell me that I can never decide what to think? But as described above, it is enough if I can decide what to think under certain circumstances. Even if that were rarely the case. In any case, changes should be recognizable for no apparent reason.

    Even if I don't decide what to dream, the dream world often changes for no apparent reason. Even in nightmares.

    Leon wrote:

    There are thoughts that you are aware of and that you can control, and others not.
    I have no problem imagining red meadows (my prime example, but it could of course be another example). In the beginning the thought of green meadows crept in again and again, but now I can imagine red meadows with the same ease as green meadows. And every time. This shows me that I can consciously think and transform the world.

    Leon wrote:

    If the world in solipsism consists only of thoughts, then it consists not only of willful thoughts, but also of involuntary thoughts (from fears, for example) and unconscious thoughts (unconscious longings, etc.).
    Assuming solipsism is true, the world does not exist when I am in deep sleep. That means that every time I start to dream or wake up, I create the world anew and thus redesign it. But it wouldn't bother me any more if I think of the world differently when I wake up than when I fall asleep. I would have to think of a world one way or another. So I might as well just leave out what I don't like.
  • Leon wrote:

    The images are generated in the brain. The world is created by the brain only in solipsism. When my brain is in my head, I don't think the world, just an image of a real world.


    Leon wrote:

    The world is created by the brain only in solipsism.


    You suspect that. You can't prove it.

    I don't need to just guess. I can also explain to you the train of thought that led me to this view: If my brain is in the head, then the rest of the body must also be real. And if I go through a world with a real body, then that world has to be real too. Then solipsism is not applicable.
    I also came to all other statements through reflection. I don't want to be satisfied with guesswork. Even if it may not always be that obvious.
  • Look menhir,

    What I want to tell you with my examples is the following:

    If you cannot rule out that your mind does not always behave as you want it (which we both have established, and what you have also admitted!), How can you rule out that the world that this (your ) Mind doesn't always behave the way you want it to?

    In solipsism, the world is completely conceived by a mind that does not always do what its owner wants. Consequently, the world that is generated by this spirit does not always do what the owner (who imagines the world with the help of his spirit) wants.
    Your statement that the world does not always listen to your mental commands is no proof against solipsism, but for the solipsist at best proof that your mind (your thoughts) cannot be controlled 100% by you.

    You claim that if the world is only made up, then you should have total control over this world.
    But that would only be so if you were in total control of your mind. But you don't have that.
    And that's why you don't have total control over the imagined world.

    Do you understand?

    Now of course you can ask the question Why our minds don't always do what we want.
    But I have to pass. I do not know that either.
    Perhaps there are solipsists who believe that a mind should be able to gain total control over its thoughts (perhaps through intensive practice).
    Such a spirit would then be able to change the world according to its wishes (only with the help of will and thoughts).
    But I am not aware of any such spirit (except maybe God. But that is also more hypothetical).
  • Leon wrote:

    "I think therefore I am" only applies to the person who pronounces the sentence (and only in relation to himself).
    With this you can prove to yourself that you exist.

    How do you know you're thinking? The other people believe but also that they think. Even so, there is a possibility that you just think about them and their thinking. That means that you can only believe that you think. To prove it, you'd have to get out of your head and see the world from an objective point of view. But since you can't get out of your head, you can't prove it. I also believe that there is an outside world, but you say that I have to get out of my head in order to see the world from an objective point of view. However, since I couldn't do it, I couldn't prove it. So the world I think could be a delusion. But same Arguments, of course, apply to thinking. Maybe the thinking is a fake. As much as I can prove that the world is not a delusion, you can prove that your thinking is not a delusion.
  • Leon wrote:

    Only you have no certainty that the others exist.
    And the others have no certainty that you exist.

    That means that everything that applies to others also applies to you. If you have no certainty that the others exist, you also have no certainty that you exist. And the others have no certainty that they exist. Prove to me that you exist by proving to me that your thinking is not a delusion. You surely already suspect that I will then hold the same arguments against you as you do me.
  • hinkelstein wrote:

    Leon wrote:

    "I think therefore I am" only applies to the person who pronounces the sentence (and only in relation to himself).
    With this you can prove to yourself that you exist.

    How do you know you're thinking? [...] Perhaps the thinking is a fake.

    Have you read through the pages that I have linked to you (methodological doubts)?
    Certainly not, otherwise you would know that deceiving is also thinking.
    If I am wrong, then I am wrong. But in order to be able to err, I have to think first.
    I cannot reasonably doubt that I think. And because I think, of course I have to exist too.
  • Leon wrote:

    I cannot reasonably doubt that I think. And because I think, of course I have to exist too.

    However, if you follow this argument, only as a thinker ... and not, as it already sounded in your case, as a brain, because in the context of this argument you have of course already admitted the existence of the outside world if you allow yourself a brain.
  • Jörn wrote:

    Leon wrote:

    I cannot reasonably doubt that I think. And because I think, of course I have to exist too.

    However, if you follow this argument, only as a thinker ... and not, as it already sounded in your case, as a brain, because in the context of this argument you have of course already admitted the existence of the outside world if you allow yourself a brain.


    I am of the opinion that there is an outside world anyway. I am not an advocate of solipsism, I am only trying to explain to Hinkelstein that solipsism cannot simply be refuted.

    (But I also noticed that the thing with the brain led to confusion, so since the last few posts I have only been writing about the mind, which is a body including the brain introduces. The brain-in-a-tank story was all about portraying the problem of perception, not the claim that the mind must have a brain. But because there was now a brain, hinkelstein - and now you - cling to it. But it's not about brains, at best about imagined ones.)
  • The difference - it seems to me - is not a small one. If the brain is admitted, the solipsism is out of the game.
  • Jörn wrote:

    The difference - it seems to me - is not a small one. If the brain is admitted, the solipsism is out of the game.

    I know that.
    With the brain-in-tank scenario, I wanted to explain the perception problem to Hinkelstein (I think this scenario is very suitable for this), and not about the fact that thinking without a brain is not possible.
    Personally, I believe that thinking takes place in the brain, but you don't have to. And the solipsists consider the body (including the brain) to be a part of the outside world anyway, i.e. an illusion.
  • Leon wrote:

    If I am wrong, then I am wrong. But in order to be able to err, I have to think first.
    I cannot reasonably doubt that I think. And because I think, of course I have to exist too.

    If other people are mistaken, if they think they are thinking, then they are thinking. And then they exist. However, since solipsism says that I exist alone, it cannot be. So where is the mistake?
  • The "mistake" is - if you follow this strange Descartian approach at all: "I'm ignoring that I I am who thinks that others think and cannot be mistaken. "
  • But what if another thinks my thinking? Then my lunatic, and my deception, is also thought of another. Then it is not my madness and my delusion. Then that just shows that someone thinks. But I can't prove that I am the one. I can only believe it.
  • Hello,

    I agree with Hinkelstein: In order to be a "real" solipsist, the world in which I find myself would have to be 100% "my work". A world that even partially eludes or defies my control shows that it is independent (of me) on this point. Perhaps you could also put it this way: A suffering Solipsist is a contradiction.

    Best wishes