How can I aim for more social capital

Social capital and value orientations: On the influence of social capital and values ​​on behavior and attitudes in Europe

Table of Contents

1 Introduction

2 Theoretical Foundations
2.1 Social capital
2.1.1 Coleman
2.1.2 Putnam
2.2 Value orientations
2.2.1 Kluckmohn
2.2.2 Rokeach
2.2.3 Inglehart
2.2.4 lawsuit
2.2.5 Black
2.3 Summary

3 state of research
3.1 Social capital
3.1.1 Social capital in Europe
3.1.2 The influence of social capital on behavior and attitudes
3.2 Value orientations
3.2.1 Value orientations in Europe
3.2.2 The influence of values ​​on behavior and attitudes
3.3 Summary

4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Hypotheses, data set and data operationalization
4.1.1 Hypotheses
4.1.2 The data set: European Social Survey 2002/2003
4.2 Data operationalization
4.2.1 Behavior and attitudes
4.2.2 Social capital
4.2.3 Values
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Structure of attitudes and behavior
4.3.2 Hypothesis testing
4.3.3 Interpretation

5 Summary and Outlook

6 directories
6.1 List of figures
6.2 List of tables
6.3 Bibliography

attachment
A Additional tables
B Instructions for factoring the value items according to Schwartz

1 Introduction

As early as the 19th century, the French social analyst Alexis de Tocqueville advocated the thesis that social organizations have a positive influence on the stability of societies and democracies. Using the example of the America of his time, he demonstrates the importance of participation in social associations of all kinds that maintain traditions, customs and civil virtues and thus contribute to the maintenance of the community:

“Americans of all ages, classes, and schools of thought keep banding together. Not only do they have commercial and industrial associations to which everyone belongs, they also have countless other types: religious, moral, serious, superficial, very general and very special, huge and small ”(Tocqueville 1976, p. 595).

Even in the 21st century, this assumption that social associations have positive effects on the performance of democracies is still considered valid. Now social capital is also examined at the micro level and its influence on individual behavior.

The modern theories about the effects of social capital are diverse, as are the empirical studies. The focus of social capital research is on the individual level, the social perspective receives little attention. In research, social capital is often related to other types of capital, such as economic resources or human capital[1] set and z. B. brought their unequal distribution in connection with each other (cf. Putnam 2001, p. 785). The investigation of other influencing factors on social capital, such as value orientations, is not pursued. The question arises as to why people enter into social ties, get involved in cooperation with others, trust them and get involved in social organizations. Social values ​​can be cited as an explanation. These are seen as influencing factors and driving forces in many areas. The outstanding importance of values ​​on the individual and on society is regarded as certain. Human behavior and attitudes in a wide variety of sociological research areas are set in relation to value orientations, both on the micro and on the macro level.

This perspective has so far been completely disregarded in social capital research. The present work therefore deals among other things. with the question of what influence social values ​​have on social capital in Europe.

This empirical analysis continues to look at the structure of social capital and value orientations: do European societies have different social capital and heterogeneous value orientations that dominate society as a whole? To what extent do the countries differ in this regard and can patterns be recognized? Furthermore, the explanatory power of both research concepts is seen with regard to different behavioral and attitude variables, since both conceptions are said to have explanatory potential with regard to these.[2]

In the second chapter, theoretical approaches to social capital and value orientations are presented.

One of the best-known current social capital researchers is the American political scientist Robert D. Putnam, who pursues Tocqueville's approaches in his theory of the origin and effects of social capital. Putnam examines social capital at both the micro and macro levels. In his analyzes he states that social capital influences individual behavior and is also essential for the stability of democracies. Since Putnam bases his concept of social capital on that of James S. Coleman, Coleman's theoretical approach is presented after a brief historical introduction to the concept of social capital. This is followed by the explanation of Putnam's social capital theory, on which the data operationalization of the empirical part is based.

In value research there is no homogeneous understanding of the concept of values. In order to present this in an understandable way, various value concepts that are used in research are presented. The focus of this work is on Schwartz's concept of values, which is used for empirical analysis.

The third chapter gives an overview of the current state of research regarding social capital and value orientations. The presented studies deal with the structure and extent of social capital and social values ​​in a European comparison. In addition, work is described that has the influence of both on behavior and attitudes towards the topic.

The fourth chapter presents the empirical analysis. The hypotheses to be tested are explained and the database and the data operationalization are described. The results are then presented and discussed in a subsequent interpretation.

2 Theoretical Foundations

The present empirical research is based on theoretical approaches from the areas of social capital and values ​​research. This chapter first introduces Coleman's concept of social capital, on which Putnam's concept of social capital, discussed below, is based.[3] An overview of the concept of values ​​is then given, with various value concepts being explained in more detail.

2.1 Social capital

There is no single definition of social capital in the research literature.

The term social capital was first used by Lyda Judson Hanifan, who published two urban sociological studies in 1916 and 1920: "The rural school community center" (1916) and "The Community Center" (1920) (cf. Putnam 2000, P. 19; Schechler 2001, p. 27). Hanifan understands social capital to be a “bundle of determinants for the formation of social groups” (Schechler 2001, p. 27), a community commitment that contributes to maintaining democracy and has both a private and a public benefit. Are social capital

“[...] those tangible qualities that are most important in people's everyday lives, namely goodwill, community spirit, compassion and social exchange between individuals and families that make up a social unit ... In social terms, the individual is helpless when he is on his own. ... When he comes into contact with his neighbors and both in turn with other neighbors, social capital accumulates with which his social needs can be satisfied directly. This social potential may also be sufficient for a substantial improvement in the living conditions of the entire community. [...] The whole community will benefit from the cooperation of its parts, and the individual will experience benefits such as help, compassion and the community spirit of his neighbors as a result of his connections ... When the people of a community trust each other and they meet occasionally for entertainment purposes, for social exchange or have become a habit for personal enjoyment, this social capital can easily be used through skillful guidance for the general improvement of the welfare of the community ”(Hanifan 1916, quoted from Putnam / Goss 2001, p. 16f.).

Jane Jacobs uses the term social capital from an urban sociological perspective. In “The Death and Life of Great American Cities” (1961) she examines the causes of the rising crime rate in American cities (cf. Haug 1997, p. 5; Schechler 2001, p. 27). She comes to the conclusion that the various functions of urban districts play a major role here: In historically grown, functional residential areas, violence is limited through social control between neighbors and thus crime is prevented. B. pure living or work areas. Jacobs emphasizes the role of trust as potential mutual support, also between people who only know each other briefly, which is solely due to the fact that they live in a shared neighborhood. This sense of community makes collective action possible. Jacobs describes such neighborhood networks as social capital. Once it is destroyed, it is irreparable and new social capital must be accumulated over time:

"If self-government in the place is to work, underlying any float of population must be a continuity of people who have forged neighborhood networks. These networks are a city’s irreplaceable social capital. Whenever the capital is lost, from whatever cause, the income from it disappears, never to return until and unless new capital is slowly and chancily accumulated ”(Jacobs 1961, p. 138).

Pierre Bourdieu looks at capital not only from an economic, but also from a cultural and social point of view and includes the mutual transformation of the different types of capital in his concept. In his work “Economic Capital, Cultural Capital, Social Capital” (1983) Bourdieu defines capital generally as accumulated labor.

Bourdieu understands social capital

“The totality of current and potential resources that come with the possession of a permanent network of more or less institutional Relationships mutual knowledge or recognition are connected. So these are resources that are based on the Belonging to a group based "(Bourdieu 1983, p. 191)

Pierre Bourdieu sees social capital as an individual resource measured by the size of the web of social relationships an individual has and the size of the capital of the others with whom it is related. It exists because of belonging to a group; The carriers of social capital are the relationships between individuals. (see Bourdieu 1983, Haug 1997).

Social relationships exist and contribute to concrete material or symbolic exchange relationships. They have a kind of “multiplier effect” (Bourdieu 1983, p. 191) on all the capital that a person has at his disposal.

The reproduction of social capital is only possible through mutual knowledge and recognition as well as ongoing “institutionalization work” (Bourdieu 1983, p. 192). This happens via the exchange of z. B. Favors or gifts and guarantees mutual social recognition. The return on social capital is higher, the larger the available capital itself is. According to Bourdieu, social capital can be delegated. For this purpose, an authorized representative must be appointed in a group who represents all members and has the entire capital of the group and thus power that he can also use to the detriment of the members:

“The mechanisms of delegation and representation [...] thus support the principle of Misappropriation of the social capital created with their help in itself ”(Bourdieu 1983, p. 194).

Bourdieu regards social capital exclusively on the individual level. He puts the resource character in the foreground and links this with the concept of power. Having capital, v. a The possession of social capital means having a power with which one determines one's own social relationships (and those of others) and uses them to achieve certain goals (cf. Schechler 2002, p. 45). He addresses social capital as an asset that only the privileged use to assert their power and superiority over others.[4]

2.1.1 Coleman

James S. Coleman embeds his understanding of social capital in his theory of action of rational choice, which takes into account both the individual and the collective level.[5]

In his work "Foundations of Social Theory"[6] Coleman designs his model of action and applies it to classic topics in the social sciences, especially sociology and political science (cf. Voss 1993, p. 366).[7] Coleman uses the concept of rationality as it applies in economic theory: Rationality corresponds to the maximization of utility (cf. Coleman 1991, p. 17).[8]

According to Coleman, the concept of social capital was introduced by Loury, who defines social capital as resources consisting of family relationships and social organization that promote the cognitive and social development of a child (cf. Coleman 1991, p. 389).

Coleman lets Loury's concept of social capital experience a change in meaning and regards social capital as socio-structural resources by explaining it through its function:

“I will treat these socio-structural resources as capital assets for the individual or as social capital. Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single structure, but is composed of a large number of different structures that have two features in common. Indeed, they all consist of some aspect of the social structure and they favor certain actions by individuals who are within the structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive because it enables the attainment of certain goals that would not be attainable without it. […] Unlike other forms of capital, social capital resides in the relationship structures between two or more people. ”(Coleman 1991, p. 392).

According to Coleman, social capital thus consists of two elements: it favors actions that are carried out in order to achieve certain goals, or it negatively influences them. Due to the structural component, social capital is also a societal reference variable (cf. Coleman 1991, p. 392; Schechler 2002, p. 101).

Social capital exists on both the individual and the societal level, which mutually influence one another. At the micro level, as with Bourdieu, social capital is an individual resource; it determines the actions of people and has a selective effect on their decisions to act. According to Coleman, individual actions can also be aggregated and thus viewed on the social level as social relationships. Social capital thus serves to explain individual action and to change from the individual to the system level (cf. Coleman 1991, p. 396). According to Coleman, the most important achievement that an action theory must fulfill is to adequately explain the transition from the individual to the social level, which is also known as the micro-macro problem.[9]

Coleman defines social capital as distinct from human capital, whereby both types of capital can complement each other. When interpersonal relationships change in such a way that certain actions are more easily possible or made possible in the first place, then social capital arises. In contrast, human capital develops as individuals develop skills that enable them to act. While human capital is an exclusively private good that a person acquires for himself through the investment of time and effort, social capital is also a public good in which everyone who is part of the social structure can participate (cf. Coleman 1988, p. 116 ).

Coleman distinguishes five different forms of social capital:

First, trust, which is made up of obligations and expectations, is of great importance because it is fundamental to systems of action. No interaction can take place if the actors do not have confidence and therefore do not take the risk of carrying out an action.[10] If person A does something for B and trusts in something in return from him, an expectation arises in A and an obligation in B to honor it, to pay off the credit that A granted. (cf. Coleman 1988, p. 102; Coleman 1991, p. 396):

"This obligation can be seen as a 'credit' that A has and that B must redeem with some kind of performance" (Coleman 1991, p. 397).

Two elements play an important role for this form of social capital: the trustworthiness of the social environment and the actual number of obligations to be met. (see Coleman 1991, p. 397). People often deliberately create obligations for rational reasons in order to obtain a profit from them: the favors given then resemble a kind of insurance policy with a low premium to be paid but a high profit (cf. Coleman 1991, p. 402).

Social structures differ in terms of the amount of outstanding obligations, which can be the case for various reasons, e.g. B. because the degree of prosperity or the closeness of social networks is different or you rely on other resources such as e. B. can fall back on state welfare services (cf. Coleman 1991, p. 398). Individuals in social structures who can redeem many outstanding credits have greater social capital available.

“The density of outstanding commitments ultimately means that the total utility of concrete resources owned by actors within this social structure is multiplied when the resources are available to other actors in an emergency” (Coleman 1991, p. 399).

A decrease in trust in a society severely limits its general potential for action and can lead to instability of the system. It could also happen that the actors give their trust elsewhere to other institutions (cf. Coleman 1991, p. 252f.).[11]

The second form of social capital is information potential. information[12] form a basis for action and favor certain actions, but their acquisition is expensive. One way to get information is to use social relationships that are actually maintained for a different purpose. With regard to this form of social capital, relationships are valuable because of the information they offer (cf. Coleman 1991, pp. 402f.).

Third, standards apply[13] and effective Coleman sanctions as a form of social capital that is influential but also fragile. It favors some actions, but restricts others or prohibits them entirely. Norms are particularly important in connection with public goods (cf. Coleman 1991, p. 403f .; Haug 1997 p. 3). The unstable character is explained by the property as a collective good and the associated problems (cf. Schechler 2002, p. 103).

According to Coleman, domination relationships are the fourth form of social capital. By giving actors control rights[14] Transferred to others, they can accumulate social capital and thus have great power. By concentrating control rights on powerful actors, the social capital of the whole community is increased because collective problems such as the free-riding problem are overcome (cf. Coleman 1991, p. 404; Haug 1997, p. 3).

Fifth, voluntary organizations set up with the intention of achieving specific goals provide social capital that their members can use. Coleman calls these "viable social organizations" (Coleman 1991, p. 405). This form of social capital is linked to targeted organizations. In these, social capital arises as a by-product of activities carried out with the intention of achieving other goals.

Since social capital is an element of social structure, it can be viewed not only as private property, but also as a public good. The closed social networks, the stability of the social structure and ideologies, social capital can both be generated and destroyed, depending on whether the influence of these factors is positive or negative. (Coleman 1991, pp. 412f.).

Coleman addresses the link between individual actions and social structure. Social action can only be explained through the action of individuals, since even in a macro-analysis in which individual data are aggregated, the individual is usually still the subject of the analysis (cf. Coleman 1991, p. 3). Explaining system behavior on the basis of individual attitudes and actions is, according to Coleman, not only more useful, but also more stable and general due to better predictability than an explanation that relates exclusively to the social level:

"Since the system behavior emerges from the actions of its constituent parts, one can expect that knowing how these constituents are linked to form a system behavior guarantees greater predictability than an explanation based on statistical relationships between the surface properties of the system" (Coleman 1991, p. 4).

The main criticism of Coleman's theory of action is that it is based exclusively on economic criteria and that the influence of human emotions is excluded (cf. Müller / Schmid 1998, p. 17). According to Coleman, the actions are based on established interests and since the rules that represent the framework for action are also undisputed, possible conflicts between the actors are not discussed (cf. Müller / Schmid 1998, p. 18).

2.1.2 Putnam

The political scientist Robert D. Putnam tries to answer questions about collective action with his conception of social capital based on Coleman's theory.

Putnam's theses go back to de Tocqueville, who considered the stability of democracies and recognized the positive influence of social communities and social participation (see Putnam 1999, p. 21; Schechler 2001, p. 61). As Neo-Tocquevilleians Putnam tries to prove that the function of social organizations is still of great importance for social cooperation today (cf. Schechler 2001, p. 61f.).

Putnam sees social capital as a key social characteristic. He defines social capital as trust, norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement, with the help of which the members of a community could more easily achieve common goals:

"By social capital’ I mean features of social life - networks, norms and trust - that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives. [...] Social capital, in short, refers to social connections and the attendant norms and trust ”(Putnam 1995, p. 664f.).

Putnam emphasizes the difference between social capital, which is constituted in interpersonal relationships, and human capital, which is exclusively an individual good:

"Whereas [...] human capital refers to properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections among individuals - social networks and norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them. In that sense social capital is closely related to what some have called ‘civic virtue’ (Putnam 2000, p. 19).

According to Putnam, social capital can be a private as well as a public good (cf. Putnam 2000, p. 20). He does not consider the conditions that allow social capital to arise, but rather the effects it has, or the consequences of different dimensions (cf. Haug, p. 5). A certain potential for historically developed social capital is assumed, namely trust, in society, which for Putnam represents the most important component of social capital. He describes this as the "'lubricant" of social life "(Putnam / Goss 2001, p. 21), as it promotes willingness to cooperate. Having trust in other people means that one has a certain certainty that one can correctly assess their actions in advance (cf. Haug 1997, p. 6):

"The theory of social capital presumes that, generally speaking, the more we connect with other people, the more we trust them, and vice versa" (Putnam 1995, p. 665).

Putnam differentiates between thin trust and thick trust (Putnam 2000, p. 136). Trust, which is based on personal experience and is expressed in relationships with certain known people who are integrated in larger networks, is also considered thick trust. Thin trust, on the other hand, exists in relation to the generalized other, i.e. the general public. Putnam considers this type of trust to be more useful than thick trust, as it expands the trust you have in others so that you can also trust people who are not as well known to you as others. According to Putnam, thin trust has a positive effect on the social commitment of individuals: Their trust in others and their own trustworthiness in society increase:

"In short, people who trust others are all-round good citizens, and those more engaged in community life are both more trusting and more trustworthy (Putnam 2000, p. 137).

Trust arises on the basis of norms of mutuality, so-called norms of reciprocity, as well as networks of civic engagement. The principle of reciprocity reduces transaction costs and facilitates cooperation. When confidence in a reciprocity norm such as B. Tit for Tat (Like you to me, like me to you) and adherence to it is high, the probability of social cooperation is also high (cf. Haug 1997, p. 6). The willingness to cooperate is also possible when the actors are foreign to each other:

"The touchstone of social capital is the principle of generalized reciprocity - I'll do this for you now, without expecting anything immediately in return and perhaps without even knowing you, confident that down the road you or someone else will return the favor" ( Putnam 2000, p. 134).

Civic engagement networks, such as B. voluntary associations, promote reciprocity norms and make it easier to obtain information about the trustworthiness of others.

Putnam emphasizes the multidimensionality of social capital and differentiates between four dimensions, each delimited by two poles:

In the first dimension he differentiates between formal and informal capital. Formal social capital is organized, e.g. B. in associations with official membership fees, while other forms of social capital have an informal character. Putnam cites a spontaneous basketball game as an example (cf. Putnam / Goss 2001, p. 25).

The second dimension differentiates between internally oriented and externally oriented social capital. While inward-oriented social capital is aimed at pursuing the interests of its own members who belong to a community based on class or gender, the outward-oriented deals with public goods, such as B. is the case in charitable organizations (cf. Putnam / Goss 2001, p. 27f.).

Third, social capital can be high or low density. Analogous to thick or thin trust, there are strong and weak ties. A strong bond exists when there is frequent and close contact with other people, while a weak bond e.g. B can be a casual acquaintance (cf. Putnam / Goss 2001, p. 26f.).

As the fourth dimension, Putnam differentiates between bridging (bridging) and binding (bonding) Social capital (see Putnam 2000, p. 22f .; Putnam / Goss 2001, p. 25f.). While binding social capital connects individuals who correspond in some characteristics, e.g. B. in age, gender or ethnicity, bridging social capital unites completely different people. In reality, most communities are bridging and binding at the same time (Putnam / Goss 2001, p. 28f.).

Putnam does admit that social capital also has a dark side (cf. Putnam 2000, p. 350f.), But puts its positive effects as a public good in the foreground. As an example of this, he cites the crime rates, which are lower in residential areas in which there is a dense network of relationships than in areas with little social capital (cf. Putnam / Goss 2001, p. 21). For Putnam, the crime rate is a measure of trustworthiness (cf. Putnam 2000, p. 144). Political participation and the economic development of a society are also favored by social capital. Both are primarily due to the dimension of social capital trust made possible in the first place. In his studies on social and political participation in America (Putnam 1995 and 2000) Putnam examines the change in social capital over time and its positive effects on political participation. It operationalizes social capital through several indicators: norms, generalized trust, and membership in organizations and political participation. Putnam notes a decline in both social and political participation since 1960. As the reason for this, he names inter alia the rise in the level of education, the increasing female employment rate and, as the main cause, a change in leisure behavior towards isolated and isolating activities, which is expressed metaphorically in the title of his book "Bowling Alone" (2000). Television in particular has a negative effect on social capital, as it restricts social participation: By devoting a large part of their time to television, people neglect the maintenance of social relationships, generally participation in social life (cf.Putnam 2000, p . 228f.).

Like Coleman, Putnam describes social capital as a characteristic that characterizes societies. In Putnam's concept, too, social capital is differentiated both as an individual and as a social characteristic of human capital, which is an exclusively private good. In contrast to Coleman, Putnam does not primarily consider the social structures and conditions that allow social capital to arise, but rather the effects that social capital has or the consequences of different dimensions of social capital (cf. Haug 1997, p. 5) .

Both Coleman and Putnam emphasize the positive effects of social capital, such as: B its reducing effect on violence and crime. Alejandro Portes, on the other hand, also highlights the negative side of social capital. His definition of social capital is: "Ability to command scarce means by virtue of membership in social structures" (Portes 1995, p. 15). Social capital creates hidden costs that arise when a community expects something in return for successes that have occurred (cf. Haug 1997, p. 8). In addition, according to Portes, social capital in closed networks promotes discrimination against outsiders, limits contact and thus relationships with people outside the community. In addition, strict standards and the obligation to conform prevent individual success (cf. Haug 1997, p. 8, p. 26).

In summary, one can say that the social capital approach is used to explain individual and social action. Social capital is seen as a cause on the one hand and as a result of actions on the other. It has a structural and a cultural component. The structural aspect includes the consideration of social networks and their distribution. On the other hand, cultural elements include trust and mutual social norms (cf. Gabriel et al. 2002, p. 26).

2.2 Value orientations

In research there is no uniform definition of the concept of values. Likewise, no uniform operationalization of values ​​is used in the numerous different value theories and a distinction is made between different dimensions. The only thing that all of these concepts have in common is the assumption that value orientations guide human action and influence attitudes. Durkheim and Weber, who both used the value concept, already emphasize the action-guiding character of values ​​and attribute the cohesion of society to this (cf. Hermann 2003, p. 52).

The most important value concepts in social research are examined in more detail below. This also includes two theories of social change in values, the concepts of Inglehart and Klages, which are fundamental to all value research.[15]

2.2.1 Kluckmohn

One of the definitions of values ​​most frequently cited in the research literature is given by Kluckhohn in his work “Values ​​and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action. An Exploration in Definition and Classification. ”(1951). Here values ​​are determined as individual or collective, time-stable ideas about what is desirable. These values ​​represent "action-guiding guidelines" (Maag 1991, p. 22), which thus influence and guide the actions as well as the action goals of individuals or groups as well as the behavior that is used to achieve the set goals:

"Value implies a code or standard which has some persistence through time, or, more broadly put, which organizes a system of action. Value, conveniently and in accordance with received usage, places things, acts, ways of behaving, goals of action on the approval-disapproval continuum. [...] A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action ”(Kluckhohn 1951, p. 395).

In this definition, the concept of values ​​contains an affective, cognitive and conative component (cf. Kluckhohn 1951, p. 395). This means that a value includes a knowledge of what is desirable, in addition it enables a sequence of actions to be supported emotionally or not.Ultimately, it triggers the implementation of a certain action, depending on the goals the person acting is striving for.

Kluckhohn differentiates between values ​​and value orientations. Values ​​consist of value orientations, which he describes as generalized, organized and existential values. Like values, value orientations can apply to both individuals and groups:

"It is convenient to use the term value-orientation for those value notions which are (a) general, (b) organized, and (c) include definitely existential judgments. A value orientation is a set of linked propositions embracing both value and existential elements. […] More formally, a value-orientation may be defined as a generalized and organized conception, influencing behavior […]. Such value-orientation may be held by individuals or, in the abstract-typical form, by groups ”(Kluckhohn 1951, pp. 409f.).

2.2.2 Rokeach

Rokeach[16] defines in "The Nature of Human Values" (1973) values ​​as relatively persistent beliefs that cause certain actions, as they make a person judge the goal of an action as desirable or undesirable. Values ​​are therefore considered to be ideal, abstract target states which, depending on a person's intention, are preferred by the person as being personally or socially desirable or not:

"A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence" (Rokeach 1973, p. 5).

Like Kluckhohn, Rokeach distinguishes three components of values: a cognitive, affective and a conative component. He also characterizes two types of values ​​that guide action: instrumental and terminal valuesthat are not independent of each other (cf. Rokeach 1973, p. 7). Terminal values ​​are e.g. B. Freedom, happiness, love or social recognition. Moral virtues, e.g. B. ambitious, courageous, honorable, loving, polite or obedient. It is questionable whether the content of some items can be separated, because z. B. the items love (mature love) and overlap loving (loving) (cf. Hermann 2003, p. 55).

Based on Maslow's needs model[17] the values ​​are arranged hierarchically (cf. Maag 1991, p. 26; Rokeach 1973, p. 16f.). The terminal values are the targeted underlyings on which the instrumental values build up. The basic values ​​specify the desired goals, the instrumental values ​​characterize the ideas about the means and actions with which the goals required by the basic values ​​are to be achieved (cf. Hermann 2003, p. 53). Rokeach's concept of values ​​can be briefly summarized as follows: Values ​​are

“Concepts and views about desirable target states and behaviors that transcend specific situations, control the selection and evaluation of behaviors and are classified according to their relative importance” (Hermann 2003, p. 53).

Rokeach measured people's values ​​with the help of a Ranking procedure (Ranking procedure), which records terminal and instrumental values. The respondents are supposed to put the given alphabetically arranged values ​​in a hierarchical order according to their subjective meaning. The disadvantage of this procedure is that the items cannot be assessed independently of one another, which implies the assumption that all the items presented belong to one value dimension (cf. Hermann 2003, p. 59).

Using a factor analysis, in which no distinction is made between terminal and instrumental values, Rokeach receives seven value dimensions that are characterized by extreme poles: immediate versus delayed need satisfaction, competence versus religious morality, Self-constriction versus Self expansion, social versus personal orientation, social versus family security, respect versus love and Inside - versus External orientation (cf. Hermann 2003, p. 60).

Rokeach's scale of values ​​criticizes the low overall variance of 40%, which explains the seven factors mentioned, the relatively low factor loads that some items have, and the inconsistencies in content. These objections show the low validity of the value scale and speak in favor of an improvement (cf. Hermann 2003, p. 60).

2.2.3 Inglehart

Inglehart understands values ​​as abstract and desirable social goals of a person (cf. Hermann 2003, p. 54). He draws on Maslow's theoretical model of the hierarchy of needs. Inglehart takes the assumption that needs are converted into value orientations, whereby he does not explain the transition from the concept of need to the value category in any more detail (cf. Klages 1992, p. 14). The physiological needs and that after security, Inglehart belongs to the group of materialistic values together. The higher needs like those according to social affiliation, social recognition or after self-realization are also called post-materialistic values summarized. This concept of values ​​is understood one-dimensionally as a value continuum with a materialistic and a post-materialistic pole. The post-materialistic values ​​only become relevant when the materialistic values ​​lose their importance, i.e. when the basic needs are satisfied, the "level of economic and physical security experienced by people reaches and exceeds the level of prosperity" (Klages 1992, p. 14) .[18]

Inglehart bases his theory on two hypotheses:

On the one hand, on the one derived from Maslow's model of needs Deficiency Hypothesis: It is assumed that individual priorities reflect the socio-economic environment of the individual and that the greatest emphasis is placed on scarce goods.[19] With the economic boom after the Second World War, the value priorities of the scarce, v. a. shifted material values ​​to post-material ones. This automatically leads to the assumption that the post-war generation, who grew up in relatively stable economic conditions, tends to have a more post-materialistic value orientation, while older people, who grew up in times of economic hardship and political instability, are more inclined to materialistic values. The living conditions prevailing in the phase of socialization therefore have an effect on the value orientation of an individual, which remains relatively stable in the adult phase. This as Socialization hypothesis[20] Inglehart attributes long-term effects to the assumed assumption, with which he emphasizes that the change in values ​​he represents is not just a temporary phenomenon, but that it is a permanent change in stable values ​​(see Inglehart 1985, Kadishi-Fässler 1993, Maag 1991) .

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[1] Human capital is the "economic term for the consideration of the people in a society as a carrier of (economically usable) education, training and achievement motivation as well as a potentially educable factor" (Hillmann 1994: Human Capital). In contrast to social capital, this form of capital is an exclusively individual good.

[2] In the following analysis, four different dependent variables are examined in detail: political participation, which is made up of voter turnout and participation in a party, as well as discrimination and fear of crime.

[3] The following empirical analysis uses Putnam's concept to operationalize social capital.

[4] This criticizes z. B. Field, since according to Bourdieu, unprivileged individuals or groups have no benefit from their social ties (cf. Field 2003, p. 20).

[5] The Rational choice approach, also the theory of rational choice, is a branch of methodological individualism. From this perspective, action is viewed as a consequence of the ability of (individual and collective) actors to make rational decisions and actions: the actor decides between different action alternatives for the action with which he can achieve his goals, which brings him the greatest benefit and profit . Decisive for the choice of action are the subjective assessment of the personal benefit that results as a consequence of the action, as well as the weighing of the probability with which the desired result will occur. The actions that promise little benefit, are associated with high costs or, due to the subjective expectation, will only occur with a low probability, are out of the question for the actor (see Hillmann 1994: Benefit Theory, Rational Choice Approach; see Kunz 2004a).

[6] The translated German edition “Fundamentals of Social Theory” is used in the present work.

[7] Voss describes Coleman's work as a “standard work on sociological theory from a rational choice perspective” (Voss 1993, p. 368).

[8] The starting point in Coleman's theoretical considerations is the individual who acts freely and independently (cf. Coleman 1986, p. 17). The actions are not determined by socialization and other social constraints, but by the free, rational and targeted choice of the individual himself: "Thus it will not begin with socialized man, but with rational man, wholly concerned with pursuit of his own interests" ( Coleman 1986, p. 17; see also Etzrodt 2003, p. 13).

[9] Coleman makes the problem of the transition between the micro and macro level clear in Weber's “Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism” (cf. Coleman 1991, p. 7f.). Weber considers the social level and assumes that religious ethics contain values ​​that contribute to the growth of a capitalist economic organization. Due to the spread of the Calvinist doctrine, according to his thesis, the value system arose that allowed the development of capitalism. According to Coleman, a linear explanation on the system level is not enough; he continues Weber's considerations by also including the individual level: The doctrine of the Protestant religion evokes certain values ​​in the individuals who adhere to it, which influence the individual attitudes, which in turn affects economic activity. Ultimately, this behavior, determined by individual convictions, which in turn are based on social values, favors a capitalist economic organization. The actions of the micro level thus again influence the social level. This model of the Coleman's bathtub (cf. Etzrodt, p. 12) can be generalized for any social action (cf. also Esser 1999). The action on the micro level is based on the boundary conditions given by the situation and the laws of rational choice, which significantly influence the decision for a certain action. Finally, the aggregation of individual actions results in a change from the micro to the macro level.

[10] Coleman distinguishes three types of trust systems: mutual trust systems, trust intermediaries, and third-party trust. Mutual trust creates mutual obligations on the part of the actors not to disappoint the trust placed in them. According to Coleman, this system has a "positive feedback" (Coleman 1991, p. 229), which makes the actors both more trusting and more trustworthy. Trust intermediaries can be described as trust brokers, Coleman differentiating between advisor, citizen and entrepreneur (cf. Coleman 1991, p. 232). The credible judgment of such an intermediary about the trustworthiness of another actor facilitates trust. Finally, Coleman also distinguishes trust in a third party. This is not directly, but only passively involved in the action. It is trustworthy for one actor and thus guarantees the trustworthiness of the second, although it is not directly involved in what is happening.

[11] Coleman cites the example of Poland: There "the extraordinarily rapid growth in members of Solidarity and the increase in trust in Lech Walesa followed a long period of disfavour by the Communist Party and the government" (Coleman 1991, p. 252).

[12] Coleman does not specify the concept of information in more detail.

[13] Norms are also fundamental for systems of action. They control action and are enforced with the help of sanctions. According to Coleman's definition, "with regard to a specific action, there is a norm [...] when the socially defined right to control the action is asserted not by the actor but by others" (Coleman 1991, p. 313). Norms are not to be taken for granted, but they arise because there is a need for them in society (cf. Coleman 2001, p. 311). Social norms determine which actions are socially recognized and desired and which are not, so there must be a social consensus.

[14] In addition to the voluntary transfer of rule, there is also involuntary rule, e.g. B. in that the state asserts control rights instead of the individual. However, Coleman takes a closer look at the transfer of rights, which is voluntary. A distinction must be made between two types of domination relationships. In the first case, one actor transfers control rights to a second because he is convinced that this will bring him benefit and serve his own interests. This relationship of domination, in which the goals of the actors coincide, is what Coleman calls "conjunct" (Coleman 1991, p. 92). In the second case, there is no common conviction that the actors pursue different interests. The subordinates who delegate their control rights expect compensation for this. Coleman describes these domination relationships as “disjoint” (Coleman 1991, p. 92f.): “Because one assumes that the actors behave rationally, conjunct domination relationships normally arise from a one-sided transfer of control rights, whereas disjoint domination relationships only arise if one Compensation is paid ”(Coleman 1991, p. 93).

[15] However, these are not directly relevant for the subsequent analysis, as the Schwartz concept is used for this.

[16] Rockeach's concept of values ​​is explained at this point, as it is the basis of Schwartz's concept of values.

[17] In his work “Motivation and Personality” (1954), the psychologist Abraham H. Maslow developed a hierarchical classification scheme for differentiating between the various types of human needs, the so-called Maslow's hierarchy of needsthat is considered universal. Only when the basic human needs are satisfied does the next level of needs become important. The individual levels of need that build on one another and together form the shape of a pyramid are: 1) basic physiological needs (form the lowest level, i.e. the base of the pyramid); 2) security needs; 3) needs for social relationships and belonging; 4) need for social recognition; 5) need for self worth; 6) Need for self-realization (the top level of the pyramid) (see Hillmann 1994, hierarchy of needs).

[18] According to Inglehart's thesis of Silent revolution, which he formulated for the first time at the beginning of the 1970s, since the 1960s there has been a one-dimensional, horizontal change in values ​​from materialistic to post-materialistic values ​​(Inglehart 1971). Responsible for this intergenerational change in values ​​is, on the one hand, the prosperity in the western states after the Second World War and, on the other hand, the fact that no more war has taken place in them.

[19] Literally it reads Deficiency Hypothesis: "An individual’s priorities reflect his or her socioeconomic environment; one places the greatest subjective value on those things that are in relatively short supply ”(Inglehart 1985, p. 496).

[20] Literally that is Socialization hypothesis: "To a large extent, one’s basic values ​​reflect the conditions that prevailed during one’s preadult years" (Inglehart 1985, p. 496).

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